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Through eight chapters of concise written text rich with analyzes of ideas and 
arguments, interweaving philosophy of mind and neuroscience data, Gligorov 
examines the impact of expansion of research in neuroscience (as the most 
developing and prominent science) and the novel neuroscientific results on 
commonsense conceptions of morality and psychology. Gligorov takes us through 
the most interesting debates in the ethics of neuroscience, including research and 
clinical practice and application of neuroscientific knowledge (altering personality 
traits, memory modification affecting self, mental privacy, definition of death 
etc.), and the neuroscience of ethics with its focus on finding neural images and 
brain activity correlates with experience of pain, traits, emotions, free will and 
moral reasoning. Discussing brain scans attractiveness and the seductiveness of 
results of the neuro studies that are nowadays often presented on the edge of their 
applicability and simplification, the author explains the implications of inevitable 
incorporation of those scientific results on common conceptions of our functioning 
and understanding life. The author describes the ways the results consequently 
affect the formulation and responses of numerous ethical questions arguing that 
„issues in ethics of neuroscience and neuroscience of ethics depend on connection 
between philosophical approaches to morality and psychological capacities to reason 
and act morally“ (p. 9). In the introductory sections of the book Gligorov reviews 
potential threats that new technologies may pose to the self. She discusses the perils 
and concerns why brain imaging and brain scans could be morally disruptive, 
affecting privacy, as well as their potential for other negative consequences, such as 
possible stigmatization of individuals with early diagnosis with brain pictures. She 
describes the possible consequences of pharmacological memory manipulation on 
personal identity with diminishing the emotional impact of trauma or, on the other 
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hand, possible instrumentallizing moral character by promoting appropriate moral 
reactions.
In the second chapter of the book, exploring the boundaries of folk morality, Gligorov 
gives arguments for evaluation and acknowledgment of commonsense concepts that 
are constantly changing due to the influence of scientific facts. Using arguments 
of anti-eliminativist stance that everything is empirically testable and citing chosen 
empirical evidence and experiments as arguments against the concept of free will, 
like Libet experiments in the third chapter of the book, Gligorov argues that the 
commonsense notion of free will should be replaced. Neuroscientific results reveal 
that our actions are not always the result of conscious decisions. Expansion of the 
scientific knowledge augments the treat of scientific determinism, yet none of the 
studies provide evidence against the phenomenon of free will, she concludes how 
concept and attributions of free will strongly depend upon background theory for 
judgments about the compatibility of the commonsense concept of free will and 
determinism.
The next two chapters deal with perils of cognitive enhancement, memory modifiers 
and altering cognitive abilities and their impact on changing the personal identity. 
The author lists potential cognitive enhancers and neuroscientific results and 
discusses the ways they can precipitate changes in personality at the individual level. 
Gligorov distinguishes numerical and narrative identity arguing how changes through 
cognitive enhancement are equal to other types of changes in self and though equally 
morally justified. According to Gligorov, the risks of cognitive enhancement exist 
not for numerical but for narrative identity defined as each person’s story which he 
or she is including one’s values in, personality traits and preferences. Gligorov raises 
ethical questions about the use of cognitive and medical enhancers, the justifications 
for their use in treatments, describing well a fine border between their usage in 
treatments and for enhancement, and exploring when such a use (of modifiers) is 
permissible. Gligorov discusses issues of distributive justice, the risk of identification 
and diagnosis of „low performers“, raising concerns for the disadvantaged. She is 
concerned about the allocation of such medical resources and interventions, as well 
as their availability. The author questions the implications of possible forced use of 
neurocognitive enhancers for the productivity, improving memory, prolonged ability 
to concentrate on tasks or stay awake, or for improving academic performance etc. 
Gligorov argues that such neuromodifications, which have an impact on traits and 
self, are not a threat for psychological continuity and consistency of an identity, 
because the changes are incorporated into personal narrative self without disruptions 
in the sense of self. Analyzing the concept of privacy, she concludes that it has already 
been expanded to include the privacy of the information on brain function as a 
result of brain imaging. In chapter 5, Gligorov presents different debates on ethical 
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permissibility of memory-modifying technologies and uses neuroscientific results 
as arguments in explaining that memory is unreliable and cannot ground narrative 
identity. Defending an argument that memory cannot as such be fundamental to 
our sense of self (memory as reconstruction of our past events not a record of past) 
or for maintaining a sense of continuity of identity and authenticity, she thinks that 
natural or pharmacological changes in memory couldn’t cause discontinuity of self. 
“The self can exist independent of the persistence of autobiographical memories.“ (p. 
86) Authenticity cannot be determined by using objective criteria though they are 
changing. The characteristics of one’s true self rely on a person’s own estimation and 
personal endorsement of them, and she reckons that voluntary memory modification 
is likely to lead to more authentic living. One of the examples are pharmaceutical 
agents, such as propranol, which can promote authenticity in cases where traumatic 
memories are obstructing the person’s ability to live an authentic life. Therefore, 
memory-modifying technologies cannot jeopardize personal identity, and memory 
enhancement does not cause discontinuity of self because narrative identity is not 
normative, and „narrative continuity of self is based on the person’s own feeling 
that such continuity exists“.  In the sixth chapter of the book, Gligorov highlights 
the ethical concerns of brain imaging by explaining limitations of those techniques. 
The author evaluates arguments, whether mental privacy in clinical and research 
settings is threatened with the brain imaging technology, such as fMRI. She reviews 
different theoretical approaches to the nature of mental states, and uses physicalist 
explanations of mental states and eliminative materialism approach while explaining 
that fMRI does not pose a threat to mental privacy. She argues that fMRI pictures are 
objectified sensations and thoughts. Therefore, they are no longer private and they 
can provide a third-person alternative to introspection. Gligorov supports the claim 
that brain imaging can be used to gain information on brain function. Thus, no 
special protection is needed for the privacy of our brain states, because brain processes 
are not more private than information obtained about other body parts. Such as, 
protecting all private medical information about patients or research participants, for 
which their disclosure is similarly harmful, if we control circumstances, information 
routinely obtained with consent in clinical settings must be protected in the same way 
as well as those relating to information about mental states and brain functioning. 
Gligorov states that disclosure of information about patients in many ways can be 
stigmatizing and that is the reason why „what doctors know about a patient is not 
limited to only that which the patient chooses to disclose“, and the “different ways of 
obtaining insight does not change the duties to protect the privacy”. (p. 113)
In the seventh chapter Gligorov argues that the privacy of pain states is the same 
as the privacy of all inner states, and that pain states and first-personal pain reports 
are not incorrigible. While expressing the feelings of pain through the experience 
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of stimulus through time, there are ways of influencing and correcting them. How 
pain is identified and characterized depends on conceptualization of pain as well 
as medical settings treatment. The author reviews the philosophical approaches to 
pain and scientific theories of pain addressing introspectability and privacy as main 
obstacles to scientific explanation and corrigibility. She finds evidence in studies 
explaining how the individuals’ ability to report having pain is tied to the individual’s 
learning how to use the concept of pain. Thus, changes in the concept affect the 
experience of pain. Gligorov concludes that there are currently no accepted third 
person criteria to challenge first person reports of pain.  Thus, utilization of objective 
means with brain imaging for identifying persons in pain is desirable and welcomed 
in the near future.  
In the last chapter of the book, Gligorov explores the ways advances in medical 
technology and modification of theories about human functioning change, as well 
the ethically fraught discussion of the definition and criterion of death. According 
to Gligorov, body and brain dualism has to be rejected. Brain death criterion is 
questioned in view of the new information on the reversibility of the vegetative state. 
Building on the concept of death of James Bernat, Gligorov redefines the concept of 
integrated functioning arguing that for the functioning of the organism as a whole or 
for being alive, the three elements of integrated organism functioning are required: 
somatic integration, psychophysical integration required for processing external 
stimuli and behavior, and the third is integration of psychological functioning, such 
as memory, consciousness, emotion, learning, attention. All these three elements can 
be used to support brain death as criterion of the death of an organism. Implications 
on individuals with severe brain injury, in coma, vegetative or minimal conscious 
states are considered. Gligorov’s intention was not to give detailed ethical analyses 
and review of all the implications of her thesis and conclusions, but to analytically 
evaluate and to give well argumented text with relevant studies and literature in 
defense of her thesis from the beginning of the book, which is, that commonsense 
moral frameworks and scientific frameworks are empirically evaluable theories. I also 
see Gligorov’s book as an important contribution to the discussion within bioethics, 
primarily for building a bridge between philosophy and neuroscience, and calling 
for stronger connection and collaboration, for dialogue and reflection outside and 
beyond once own’s discipline integrating the knowledge so important and relevant 
to the daily lives of all of us. Gligorov asserts that responsibility for integration 
of neuroscientific knowledge into positive, humanistic goals, such as those set by 
humanistic call of medicine: preserving health and curing the disease, lies within 
both of them.
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